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У статті розглянуті корупція та культурні відмінності через призму моделі Тромпенаарса 
 
В статье рассмотрены коррупция и культурные различия через призму модели 
Тромпенаарса 
 
This study builds on the work of Tsakumis et al. (2007) by conducting further empirical analysis 
of the relationship between cultural dimensions and corruption across countries using multiple 
measures of corruption to gain additional evidence on the subject. Moreover, this study extends 
the preliminary international tax evasion model developed by Tsakumis et al. (2007) to examine, 
along with culture, the impact of Trompenaarsian dimensions on corruption across countries. 
Based on data from 41 countries, and after controlling for economic development, the regression 
results indicate that the higher the level of collectivism the higher the level of diffuse and the 
lower the level of achievement, the higher is the level of tax evasion across countries. These 
findings remain robust to multiple measures of corruption. Managers should find the results of 
this study useful in assessing the likelihood of corruption from cultural perspectives, and in 
developing tax reform policies to reduce tax evasion and corruption. 
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Introduction. Nobody likes paying taxes. The most popular instrument to 
“force” people to pay their taxes is deterrence policy. In line with the economics of 
crime approach, based on the expected utility maximization calculus, Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) presented a formal model, showing that the extent of tax 
evasion is negatively correlated with the probability of detection and the degree of 
punishment. However, this groundbreaking model has many shortcomings. People 
who exhibit empirically observed levels of risk aversion normally pay their taxes, 
although there is a low probability of getting caught and being penalized. Thus, 
people are more honest than deterrence models would predict. There is a wide gap 
between the risk aversion that would guarantee such a high compliance and the 
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much lower individual risk aversion observed in reality (Graetz & Wilde, 1985; 
Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1999; Frey & Feld, 2002). Tax compliance 
experiments also indicate that individuals report a higher level of income than the 
expected utility model would predict (Alm, 1999; Torgler, 2002). Many years ago, 
Baldry (1987: 377) pointed out: “Rather than question the experimental method, 
these results suggest that it is perhaps the theory which needs revision (...)”. 
Traditional models have the disadvantage that they treat taxation and corruption 
as an isolated case. However, recent studies indicate that subjects do not act as 
isolated individuals playing a “game against nature” (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 
1992; Wenzel & Taylor, 2004). In this paper, I emphasize the relevance that tax 
compliance and corruption take place in a social context. The behavior of other 
taxpayers and social actors is of great importance in understanding taxpayers’ 
compliance and the reallocation of power and resources. As a consequence, 
theories on pro-social behavior, that take the behavior of others into account, may 
be a promising concept. Taxpayers are willing to pay their taxes conditionally, 
depending on the pro-social behavior of other taxpayers; the more other taxpayers 
are perceived to be honest, the more willing individuals are to pay their own taxes. 
The extent to which others also contribute triggers more or less cooperation and 
systematically influences the willingness to contribute. I use survey data to test 
whether “conditional cooperation” can be identified.  
Tax evasion3 and corruption
4
 is a widespread phenomenon and continues to be 
a problem for many countries. For example, Greece’s underground economy is 
estimated to equal approximately 40% of GDP—the largest in the European Union 
(Athens, 1997). Italian tax authorities estimate that 15% of all economic activity 
goes unreported (Rome, 1997).
5
 In the United States, estimates of lost tax revenues 
for 2001 were as high as $353 billion. Of this $353 billion, intentional 
underreporting of income represented anywhere from $250 to $292 billion (IRS, 
2005). 
Some form of penalty usually is used as a means to control tax evasion 
within countries. The penalties most commonly used in the United States 
include fines and imprisonment. Even though penalties and audits exist, tax 
evasion continues to pose a significant threat to countries’ economies by placing 
a strain on a country’s budget through lost revenues. Many studies have 
                                                          
3
 As noted by Sandmo (2005), tax evasion is a violation of tax law whereby the taxpayer refrains from reporting 
income which is, in principle, taxable. Tax avoidance is within the legal framework whereby the taxpayer takes 
advantage of tax provisions to minimize the tax liability. Also, it is important to distinguish between tax evasion and 
corruption, which are very different concepts. Tax evasion involves hiding the real value of a legal transaction to 
avoid fiscal (i.e., tax) liability, while corruption involves a transaction in which one agent typically pays a sum of 
money or performs a service in exchange for an illicit act by a public official (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998). 
4
 Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse or violation of power. 
5
 The IRS (2005) updated its estimates of the tax gap for 2001 to $343 billion as the difference between what 
taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid on a timely basis. This revised figure falls at the high end 
of the range of $312 to $353 billion per year. 
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examined the effects of varying penalties, audit rates, and other variables on tax 
evasion (Porcano, 1988); fewer empirical studies have examined tax compliance 
levels from an international perspective (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 
2006). Only Alm and Torgler (2006) investigates the relation of culture to tax 
morale for a “large” number (16) of countries. 
This study further explores the role that national culture might play in 
explaining countries’ tax evasion behaviour. Culture is a multivariate concept, 
and this is the first study to investigate which cultural framework is the best as 
an explanator of international corruption diversity; that is, it uses Trompenaars’ 
7 cultural dimensions as measures of culture and analyzes their relation to 
corruption for 41 countries in various geographic areas. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore the extent to which 
international differences in corruption can be explained by differences in 
national culture, as proposed by Trompenaars (1993). Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner defined a different set of dimensions during their cross-
cultural studies, using a database containing more than 30.000 survey results. 
These dimensions are universalism vs. particularism, individualism vs. 
communitarianism, achievement vs. ascription, neutral vs. affective, specific vs. 
diffuse, human-nature relationship, human-time relationship. 
The results suggest that these cultural frameworks appear to be relevant in 
explaining corruption levels. In case of Trompenaars’ model, higher (lower) 
collectivism and diffuse dimensions are associated with higher (lower) 
corruption levels across countries. I found controversial correlation between 
achievement and corruption.  
Culture and cultural dimensions 
Culture has been defined in several different ways. Some of the commonly 
used definitions of culture are presented in this section. Some defines culture as 
a set of values that an individual grows up with. They add that it is a 
combination of the personal values and morals as well as the society's influence 
on the individual in his/her growing years. Hence, it is the shared way groups of 
people understand and interpret the world. They conclude that culture influences 
the ways in which a person perceives and reacts to certain situations. 
The anthropological term designates those aspects of the total human 
environment, tangible and intangible, which have been created by men. A 
“culture” refers to the distinctive way of life of a group of people, their complete 
“design for a living”. Culture seems to be the master concept of American 
anthropologists. 
Most anthropologists would basically agree with Herskovits’s propositions 
on the theory of culture: 
Culture is learned. 
Culture is derives from the biological, environmental, psychological, and 
historical components of human existence. 
Culture is structured. 
Culture is divided into aspects. 
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Culture is dynamic. 
Culture is variable. 
Culture exhibits regularities that permit its analysis by the method of 
science. 
Culture is the instrument whereby the individual adjust to his total setting, 
and gains the means for the creative expression.  
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) suggested an other definition: 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behaviour 
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of 
human groups, including their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of 
culture consists of traditional (i. e., historically derived and selected) ideas and 
especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be 
considered as products of action, on the other, as conditioning elements in a 
future action. 
Trompenaars, as Hofstede, underlines the collective nature of culture. 
Trompenaars' brief and well-known definition is the following: 'culture is the 
way in which a group of people solves problems.' (Trompenaars, 1993: 6) 
Trompenaars’ cultural dimensions are summarized as follows: 
Universalism versus particularism (T_UNI): The first dimension defines 
how people judge the behaviours of their colleagues. People from universalistic 
cultures focus more on rules, are more precise when defining contracts and tend 
to define global standards for company policies and human resources practices. 
Within more particularistic national cultures, the focus is more on the 
relationships; contracts can be adapted to satisfy new requirements in specific 
situations and local variations of company and human resources policies are 
created to adapt to different requirements.  
Individualism and Communitarianism (T_COL): This dimension classifies 
countries according to the balance between the individual and group interests. 
Generally, team members with individualist mind-sets see the improvements to 
their groups as the means to achieve their own objectives. By contrast, the team 
members from communitarian cultures see the improvements to individual 
capacities as a step towards the group prosperity. 
Achievement versus ascription (T_ACH): This dimension, presented in 
Trompenaars studies, is very similar to Hofstede’s power distance concept. 
People from achievement-oriented countries respect their colleagues based on 
previous achievements and the demonstration of knowledge, and show their job 
titles only when relevant. On the other hand, people from ascription-oriented 
cultures use their titles extensively and usually respect their superiors in 
hierarchy. 
Neutral versus affective (T_NEU): According to Trompenaars, people from 
neutral cultures admire cool and self-possessed conducts and control their 
feelings, which can suddenly explode during stressful periods. When working 
with stakeholders from neutral countries you may consider avoiding warm, 
expressive or enthusiastic behaviours, prepare beforehand, concentrate on the 
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topics being discussed and look carefully for small cues showing that the person 
is angry or pleased. People from cultures high on affectivity use all forms of 
gesturing, smiling and body language to openly voice their feelings, and admire 
heated, vital and animated expressions. 
Specific versus diffuse (T_DIFF): Trompenaars researched differences in 
how people engage colleagues in specific or multiple areas of their l ives, 
classifying the results into two groups: people from more specific-oriented 
cultures tend to keep private and business agendas separate, having a completely 
different relation of authority in each social group. In diffuse-oriented countries, 
the authority level at work can reflect into social areas, and employees can adopt 
a subordinated attitude when meeting their managers outside office hours. 
Human-nature relationship (internal vs external control) (T_NAT): 
Trompenaars shows how people from different countries relate to their natural 
environment and changes. Global project stakeholders from internal-oriented 
cultures may show a more dominant attitude, focus on their own functions and 
groups and be uncomfortable in change situations. Stakeholders from external-
oriented cultures are generally more flexible and willing to compromise, valuing 
harmony and focusing on their colleagues, being more comfortable with change. 
Human-time relationship (T_TIME): Trompenaars identified that different 
cultures assign diverse meanings to the past, present and future. People in past-
oriented cultures tend to show respect for ancestors and older people and 
frequently put things in a traditional or historic context. People in present-
oriented cultures enjoy the activities of the moment and present relationships. 
People from future-oriented cultures enjoy discussing prospects, potentials and 
future achievement.  
 
Corruption 
Corruption, as with many ethical concepts, is very difficult to define in a 
universally acceptable fashion. While Webster’s Dictionary defines corruption 
as “bribery or similar dishonest dealings,” what may be classified as corruption 
to some may not be so classified as corruption by others. For example, bribery 
and political favouritism may be considered corruption and unacceptable by 
some but an acceptable business practice by others (Jain, 2000). Scholarly 
interest in corruption is growing fast, both in terms of theoretical treatment and 
empirical research. Comprehensive reviews of that literature are offered in 
Husted (1999). 
Formal institutions cannot adequately explain the distinct levels of tax 
evasion and corruption in different countries. In addition, wherein taxes are a 
windfall burden, it should not matter to a citizen whether the government 
delivers the services promised or not, or whether or not other people pay. If we 
move a step further, we found the public choice approach which introduces 
public goods as another aspect of formal institutions. The outcome is, however, 
that it is generally still rational for a citizen to completely free ride and not pay 
taxes, no matter what the government and other citizens do. As a result, the 
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public choice approach does not solve the puzzle either. We can broaden the 
analysis by introducing the level of trust, both between citizens and the 
government, and between the citizens themselves as variables to explain tax 
evasion and corruption. 
Given that the problem of tax evasion appears to be more substantial in 
institutionally less developed countries (i.e., transition countries). About a 
decade ago, these countries went through an institutional shock, caused by the 
collapse of former communist regime. The level of the institutional shock varied 
per country, depending on the type of regime. On one hand, the communist 
regime was over-organized, where bureaucratic orders and ideological 
repression determined what individuals had to do. On the other hand, it was 
characterized by organizational failure, which motivated individuals to create 
and rely on informal networks. Such a ‘dual society’ of formal versus informal 
networks (institutions) was far more developed in the Soviet Union, where it had 
been in place for more than 70 years, than in the Czech Republic (Rose, 2000). 
In Eastern Europe, similar characteristics were observed in Albania, where the 
totalitarian regime lasted for more than 40 years. As a consequence, these 
societies experienced significant distrust in the government and formal 
institutions. The substitute was found in family-, friends- or local networks. 
After the collapse of communism, in countries where the ‘dual society’ was 
dominant, and where in addition the new governments did not manage to 
function properly, trust has eroded even further, forcing people to invest and rely 
more on networks. 
 
Sample 
The sample for this study (see Table 1) consists of 41 countries. It 
encompasses both developed and developing countries, and a mixture of 
countries distinguished by language, culture, and geography. The countries 
included in the sample are diverse. I chose countries what have all needed 
scores: cultural dimensions, CPI, control variables. Data for this study are 
collected from a broad range of public sources. I retrieved the data from World 
Bank’s database, Hofstede’s database, and other websites (such as 




The level of economic development in a country may influence its level of 
corruption. I use HDI factor, GI factor by Kaufmann et. al (1999a; 1999b), and 
taxes on goods and services by World Bank (E_TOGS) as control variables. 
Tsakumis et al. (2007) expected a negative relation between the level of 
economic development and the level of tax evasion in a country.6 I expect a 
                                                          
6
 It is a limitation of Tsakumis et al.’s work (2007) because we could improve the robustness of model, if we 
include such variables like Richardson (2008) did: legal enforcement (LEGAL), trust in government (TGOV), 
and religiosity (RELIG). 
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negative relation between HDI factor and the level of corruption; positive 
relation between E_TOGS and the level of corruption – more taxes, higher 
corruption; and positive relation between GI factor and the level of corruption – 
GI factor is the description of government’s performance and bureaucracy. 
 
Table 1- List of sample countries (n=41) 
 
Argentina Hungary Portugal 
Australia India Russia 
Austria Indonesia Singapore 
Brazil Ireland South Africa 
Canada Italy Spain 
China Israel Sweden 
Czech Republic Japan Switzerland 
Denmark Malaysia Taiwan 
Egypt Mexico Thailand 
Finland Netherlands Turkey 
France New Zealand UK 
Germany Nigeria USA 
Greece Philippines Venezuela 
Hong Kong Poland  
Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1a. The higher the HDI factor in a country, the lower the level of 
corruption in that country. 
Hypothesis 1b. The higher the E_TOGS in a country, the higher the level of 
corruption in that country. 
Hypothesis 1c. The higher the GI factor in a country, the higher the level of 
corruption in that country. 
Cultural variables 
The primary variables of interest are T_COL, T_DIFF, and T_ACH. My 
hypotheses predict positive sign on T_COL (higher T_COL leads to higher 
corruption in a country), on T_DIFF (higher T_DIFF leads to higher corruption 
in a country), and on T_ACH (higher T_ACH leads to higher corruption in a 
country). 
Hypothesis 2a.   The higher the T_COL in a country, the higher the level of 
corruption in that country. 
Hypothesis 2b.   The higher the T_DIFF in a country, the higher the level of 
corruption in that country. 
Hypothesis 2c.   The higher the T_ACH in a country, the lower the level of 







I modified the research design of Tsakumis et al. (2007). Cultural 
frameworks provide index scores for the seven national cultural dimensions for 
the 41 countries. Thus, this study investigates corruption levels across 41 




My hypotheses relate to the impact of national cultural dimensions on 
corruption levels across countries. Actual corruption is unknown and impossible 
to determine; thus, studies on corruption use surrogate measures for actual 
corruption. Many studies use hypothetical corruption or perceptions of 
corruption. Some use government estimates of corruption. No single measure 
has been shown to be better than any other measure. 
I use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) offered by Transparency 
International since 1995. Although it is difficult to agree on a precise definition, 
there is consensus that corruption refers to acts in which the power of public 
office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the 
game (Jain, 2000). I updated the data and looked for scores for every sample 
countries. I used data of 1995-2010. Table 2 lists the sample countries along 
with their mean CPI scores. These countries are located in all parts of the globe, 
range from large to small, and include both developed and developing nations. 
The three highest scores (i.e., the least corrupt countries) are Denmark, New 
Zealand, and Sweden. Nigeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela are the most corrupt. 
 
Table 2- Corruption levels for sample countries 
 
Country CPI Country CPI Country CPI 
Argentina 3,0975 Hungary 4,9850 Portugal 6,3538 
Australia 8,6788 India 2,9725 Russia 2,3900 
Austria 7,9019 Indonesia 2,2256 Singapore 9,1888 
Brazil 3,6513 Ireland 7,7375 South Africa 4,8969 
Canada 8,8456 Italy 4,6400 Spain 6,3475 
China 3,2481 Israel 6,7320 Sweden 9,2375 
Czech 
Republic 
4,5980 Japan 6,9900 Switzerland 8,8269 
Denmark 9,5431 Malaysia 5,0069 Taiwan n/a  
Egypt 3,1386 Mexico 3,3713 Thailand 3,3113 
Finland 9,4844 Netherlands 8,8519 Turkey 3,7219 
France 6,9013 New Zealand 9,4381 UK 8,3831 
Germany 7,9088 Nigeria 1,7767 USA 7,5100 
Greece 4,4625 Philippines 2,7131 Venezuela 2,3706 







The independent variables are denoted in this study by Trompenaars’s 
cultural dimensions and in addition, control variables (HDI factor, GI factor, and 
E_TOGS). The cultural dimensions are all measured in terms of country-based 
scores. 
Model specification 
The standard model consists from cultural variables and the control 
variables. I use only one cultural framework for a model. According to the 
hypotheses, I constructed a model. 
To test my hypotheses, I estimate the following model for Trompenaars’ 
model: 
 
iiiiiiiiiiii eE_TOGSaGIaHDIaNATTaTIMETaACHTaNEUTaDIFFTaCOLTaUNITaaCPI 109876543210 _______  (1) 




Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of 41 countries. 
Considerable diversity exists with regard to corruption levels across countries. 
There is considerable variability in the independent variables of primary interest. 
 
Table 3- Descriptive statistics 
 
  N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CPI 40 1,78 9,54 5,8416 2,53918 
T_UNI 41 17,00 90,00 56,3659 17,11543 
T_COL 41 10,00 90,00 51,7561 19,08636 
T_DIFF 41 10,00 90,00 45,3659 20,42273 
T_NEU 41 10,00 80,00 51,3415 13,73428 
T_ACH 41 16,00 95,00 56,4634 16,97660 
T_TIME 41 ,00 2,00 ,9268 ,72077 
T_NAT 41 10,00 90,00 49,3902 17,03948 
HDI factor 40 -2,60156 1,37788 ,0000000  
GI factor 41 -2,11892 1,26991 ,0000000  
E_TOGS 37 3,1195 56,4124 29,4809 12,5512 
 
Hypothesis testing for Trompenaars’ cultural dimensions 
Table 5 reports the results from estimating the multiple regression model 
specified in Eq. (1). The model is significant (F = 35.623, p < .0001) and the 
independent variables explain a relatively high percentage of variation in the 
dependent variable (adjusted R2 of .932). The results for the primary variables 
of interest are the same both with and without the inclusion of the control 
variables in the model. 
                                                          
7
 I used SPSS for analysing data. 
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Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 2,766 1,283   2,156 ,041 
HDI factor ,206 ,193 ,082 1,070 ,295 
GI factor 2,440 ,230 ,953 10,616 ,000 
E_TOGS -,007 ,012 -,036 -,623 ,539 
T_UNI ,029 ,014 ,197 2,114 ,044 
T_COL -,004 ,010 -,033 -,416 ,681 
T_DIFF ,033 ,016 ,245 2,032 ,052 
T_NEU ,014 ,015 ,069 ,932 ,360 
T_ACH -,002 ,018 -,015 -,124 ,903 
T_TIME -,215 ,237 -,061 -,907 ,373 
 T_NAT ,001 ,011 ,007 ,098 ,923 
 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that higher T_COL is related to higher corruption 
levels across countries. Even after controlling for the level of economic 
development across countries, the regression coefficient for T_COL is negative 
and not significant (p = .681). Thus, I conclude that higher T_COL is related to 
lower corruption levels across countries, but it does not influence significantly 
the CPI. 
Hypothesis 2b predicted that higher T_DIFF is related to higher corruption 
levels across countries. The regression coefficient for T_DIFF is positive and 
not significant (p = .052). Higher T_DIFF is related to higher corruption levels 
across countries, supporting Hypothesis 2b. 
Hypothesis 2c predicted that higher T_ACH is related to lower corruption 
levels across countries. The regression coefficient for T_ACH is negative and 
not significant (p = .903). Higher T_ACH is related to lower corruption levels 
across countries, supporting Hypothesis 2c. 
Control variable 
Table 4, 5, 6 also report a relation between the level of economic 
development (HDI factor, GI factor, E_TOGS) and corruption levels across 
countries. 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that higher HDI factor is related to lower corruption 
levels across countries. The regression coefficient for HDI is negative and not 
significant. Thus, I conclude that higher HDI is related to lower corruption 
levels across countries, but it does not influence significantly the CPI. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1a is supported. 
Hypothesis 1b predicted that higher E_TOGS is related to higher corruption 
levels across countries. The regression coefficient for E_TOGS is negative and 
not significant. Thus, I conclude that higher E_TOGS is related to lower 
corruption levels across countries, but it does not influence significantly the CPI. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1b is surprisingly ignored. 
171 
 
Hypothesis 1c predicted that higher GI factor is related to higher corruption 
levels across countries. The regression coefficient for GI is positive and 
significant. Thus, I conclude that higher GI is related to higher corruption levels 




In this study, I investigated the influence of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
on tax compliance levels across 57 countries. Taken as a whole, my results 
support the general proposition that national culture, as proposed by Hofstede, is 
a significant factor in explaining tax evasion levels across countries. The results 
of the proposed model (Eq. (1)) show that neither of two new cultural 
dimensions are related to international tax evasion levels in the expected 
directions. Specifically, the results indicate that higher (lower) uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance are associated with higher (lower) tax evasion 
levels across countries while higher (lower) individualism is associated with 
lower (higher) tax evasion across countries, as tested by Tsakumis et al. (2007). 
This result is consistent with research examining the relationship between 
Hofstede’s framework and global financial reporting, particularly for uncertainty 
avoidance and individualism (Doupnik & Tsakumis, 2004). And it was also 
found that higher (lower) masculinity is associated with lower (higher) tax 
evasion. 
This study investigated if the model offered by Tsakumis et al. (2007) is able 
to manage new variables what could prove robustness. That model employed 
Hofstede’s cultural framework as a means to explain international tax 
compliance diversity. Its results suggest that national culture is useful in 
explaining tax evasion levels across countries. Based on their results, we can 
describe a tentative cultural profile of a low tax compliance country (i.e., a high 
tax evasion country) as one that possesses high UA, low IND, low MASC, and 
high PD. These results may aid in directing future research by serving as the 
beginning of a framework for future international tax compliance studies. But 
we can recognize that culture is an unsteady factor. More and more aspects 
linked with culture are discovered. That is why, it is hard to predict cultural 
profile exactly, as we can not understand completely its influence on 
phenomenon and on other cultural dimensions. 
The limitations of Tsakumis et al. (2007)’s research also appear in this 
current study. First, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were developed over 20 
years ago, which may make them appear outdated. However, it is important to 
note that several studies (Merritt, 2000) confirm the reliability, validity, 
applicability, and direction of differences of Hofstede’s scores over time and  
across countries. Second, the current study focuses on national cultural 
dimensions as the primary explanators of tax evasion levels across countries. To 
develop a more complete international tax compliance model, future research 
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should examine other variables (e.g., countries’ legal systems8) in conjunction 
with national culture. Third, this study’s sample consisted of 57 countries, and 
the sampling was not appropriate in statistical sense. Therefore, additional 
research may be needed to ensure that the results are generalizable to other 
countries. In addition, future research should examine the role of national 
culture in mitigating the efficacy of tax evasion penalties within and across 
countries. It also should explore the use of “home country” and “tax  return 
preparation outsourced” as additional variables in audit-selection models. 
The model is weakening by adding more variables, that is why reviews are 
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